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NOT PRECEDENTIAL
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
_____________
No. 07-1290
_____________
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
       v.
BYRON CHAMBERLAIN,
               Appellant
_______________
On Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania
(D.C. No. 05-cr-0399)
District Judge: Honorable Gene E.K. Pratter
_______________
Submitted Under Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a)
June 6, 2008  
Before:   FISHER, JORDAN, and VAN ANTWERPEN, Circuit Judges
_____________
(Filed: July 25, 2008)
_______________
OPINION OF THE COURT
_______________
JORDAN, Circuit Judge
Byron Chamberlain appeals his sentence, imposed pursuant to the Armed Career
Criminal Act (“ACCA”), 18 U.S.C. § 924(e), for violations of that Act and 18 U.S.C.
    The District Court had jurisdiction pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3231.  We have appellate1
jurisdiction pursuant to both 28 U.S.C. § 1291 and 18 U.S.C. § 3742(a).  We exercise
plenary review over Chamberlain’s claim that he was not subject to the ACCA.  United
States v. Jones, 332 F.3d 688, 690-91 (3d Cir. 2003).  We also exercise plenary review
over his claim that the failure to charge his predicate offenses in the indictment and prove
them to the jury violated his Fifth and Sixth Amendment rights.  United States v.
Williams, 235 F.3d 858, 861 (3d Cir. 2000).
2
§ 922(g)(1), which prohibits convicted felons from carrying firearms.  He asserts that the
District Court erred in applying the ACCA at sentencing because one of his prior state
drug convictions did not qualify as an ACCA predicate offense.  He further asserts that
his sentence should be vacated because the Fifth and Sixth Amendments require that his
predicate offenses be charged in the indictment and proved to a jury beyond a reasonable
doubt.  We will affirm the District Court’s judgment of sentence.1
I. Background
On June 13, 2006, Chamberlain was convicted by a jury for possession of a
firearm by a convicted felon.  His conviction stemmed from an incident on October 22,
2004, when Philadelphia police officers arrested him for carrying a loaded twelve gauge
shotgun in a city park.  On January 29, 2007, the District Court imposed the mandatory
minimum sentence required by the ACCA, sentencing Chamberlain to fifteen years’
imprisonment, three years’ supervised release, and a $100 special assessment fee.  
II. Discussion
The ACCA applies to recidivists with three or more prior convictions for violent
felonies or “serious drug [offenses].” 18 U.S.C. § 924(e)(1).  A serious drug offense is
3defined as including “an offense under State law, involving manufacturing, distributing,
or possessing with intent to manufacture or distribute, a controlled substance ... for which
a maximum term of imprisonment of ten years or more is prescribed by law.” 18 U.S.C.
§ 924(e)(2)(A)(ii).  The District Court applied the ACCA during Chamberlain’s
sentencing because he had previously pleaded guilty to three felony drug convictions.
Those convictions arose from incidents of drug possession and distribution that took
place on September 7, 1993 (the “September offense”), February 25, 1994 (the “February
offense”); and April 27, 1994 (the “April offense”). 
On appeal, Chamberlain acknowledges that his convictions for the February and
April offenses are ACCA predicate offenses because each of those convictions exposed
him to a punishment of ten years or more.  He claims, however, that the government
cannot show that his conviction stemming from the September offense exposed him to a
minimum ten-year sentence and that, as a result, he lacks the three convictions necessary
to enhance his sentence under the ACCA. 
The charging document for the September offense indicates that Chamberlain was
charged with–and pleaded guilty to–a violation of 35 Pa. Cons. Stat. § 780-113(a)(30)
(2005) which proscribes “the manufacture, delivery, or possession with intent to
manufacture or deliver, a controlled substance.”  The same document also lists the
controlled substance at issue as “cocaine, marihuana.”  (App. at 36.)  With certain
exceptions not relevant here, Pennsylvania law punishes a conviction for possession with
4the intent to distribute marijuana with a maximum of five years imprisonment, and
punishes a conviction for possession with the intent to distribute cocaine with a maximum
of ten years imprisonment.  35 Pa. Cons. Stat. Ann. §§ 780-113(f)(1.1) and (2).   
Relying on the differing potential penalties imposed under Pennsylvania law for
possession with the intent to distribute marijuana and for possession with intent to
distribute cocaine, Chamberlain argues that because the charging document for the
September offense lists both cocaine and marijuana, he might have pleaded guilty to
possession with intent to distribute only marijuana, not cocaine.  Therefore, he argues,
because a marijuana conviction does not carry a possible ten-year sentence, his conviction
for the September offense cannot be an ACCA predicate offense, and the District Court
erred by applying an enhanced sentence.  
Chamberlain’s argument does not withstand scrutiny.  In analyzing when a prior
conviction may serve as an ACCA predicate offense, the permissible evidentiary scope is
limited.  Trial courts should “look only to the fact of conviction and the statutory
definition of a prior offense” in determining whether an offense constitutes an ACCA
predicate.  Taylor v. United States, 495 U.S. 575, 602 (1990).  In addition, the trial court
may also rely on “the terms of the charging document ... or transcript of colloquy between
judge and defendant in which the factual basis for the plea was confirmed by the
defendant or ... some comparable record of [the same] information.”  Shepard v. United
States, 544 U.S. 13, 26 (2005).
5Here, the plea colloquy between Chamberlain and the Pennsylvania sentencing
court regarding the September offense makes clear that, as a result of that offense,
Chamberlain faced a maximum sentence of ten years’ imprisonment.  During that
colloquy, the prosecutor expressly told Chamberlain that his maximum term of
imprisonment for the September offense was ten years.  When asked in the presence of
the court whether he understood that potential sentence, Chamberlain replied in the
affirmative.  In addition, Chamberlain admitted during the colloquy that, as part of the
September offense, he possessed nearly three grams of cocaine divided into sixty-two
individual packets.  Thus, Chamberlain’s plea colloquy was one “in which the factual
basis for the plea was confirmed by the defendant.”  Id.  Thus, his attempt to manufacture
an ambiguity based on the charging document for the September offense fails. 
Chamberlain next argues that his Fifth and Sixth Amendment rights were violated
because none of his predicate offenses were charged in the indictment or proven to a jury
beyond a reasonable doubt.  He seems to recognize, however, that his position is contrary
to precedent (Appellant’s Brief at 32), and we reject his argument.  See Apprendi v. New
Jersey, 530 U.S. 466, 490 (2000) (explaining that “[o]ther than the fact of a prior
conviction, any fact that increases the penalty for a crime beyond the prescribed statutory
maximum must be submitted to a jury, and proved beyond a reasonable doubt”) (emphasis
added); Almendarez-Torres v. United States, 523 U.S. 224, 247 (1998) (rejecting claim
that “recidivism must be treated as an element of [an] offense”); United States v.
6Thornton, 327 F.3d 268, 273 (3d Cir. 2003) (rejecting claim that characterization of
armed career criminal should be treated as element of an offense). 
III. Conclusion
For the foregoing reasons, we will affirm the District Court’s judgment of
conviction and sentence.
